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Burdening Constitutional Rights: The Supreme Court’s
License to Prosecutors
By Bennet L. Gershman
In Portuondo v. Agard,1
decided last March, the
Supreme Court ruled that it is
permissible for a prosecutor to
argue to a jury that a defendant’s testimony at trial should
be disbelieved because his presence at trial gave him a unique
opportunity to tailor his testimony to that of all the other
witnesses. The Court reversed
the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which found, apparently in a case
of first impression in the federal system, that such
generic comment violated the defendant’s right to confrontation, to testify, and to receive due process and a
fair trial.2
The Second Circuit reasoned that the prosecutor’s
remark invited the jury to consider the defendant’s
exercise of his right to confrontation as evidence of his
guilt, and penalized him for exercising that right. Such
comment, according to the Second Circuit, implies that
a truthful defendant would have stayed out of the
courtroom before testifying, or would have testified
before other evidence was presented. The prosecutor’s
conduct, in essence, forces a defendant either to forgo
his right to be present at trial, his right to testify on his
own behalf, or risk the jury’s suspicion.
A bare majority of the Supreme Court disagreed. It
found that the Second Circuit’s decision lacks historical
support, is distinguishable from precedents forbidding
prosecutors to place burdens on a defendant’s exercise
of constitutional rights, and is inconsistent with the central function of the trial to discover the truth.
The prosecutorial tactic of burdening a defendant’s
exercise of constitutional rights has appeared in a variety of contexts. Prosecutors have asked juries to infer
guilt based on a defendant’s decision not to testify,3 not
to call witnesses,4 to remain silent after being given
Miranda warnings,5 to go to trial,6 to secure the assistance of counsel,7 to refuse to consent to a warrantless
search,8 and to testify.9 In all of these instances, courts
have found the prosecutor’s remarks to constitute misconduct.
Constitutional limitations on a prosecutor’s ability
to make such comments originated in the Supreme

Court’s decision in Griffin v. California,10 as reinforced
by Doyle v. Ohio.11 In Griffin, the Court held that allowing a prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s failure to
testify violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. “It is a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege,” the Court stated.
“It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion
costly.”12 Rejecting the argument that such inference by
a jury was “natural and irresistable,” the Court
observed that while a jury might make such inference
on its own, neither a court nor a prosecutor should be
allowed to affirmatively encourage it to do so.13
Following Griffin, the Supreme Court held in Doyle
that a prosecutor violates due process when he uses a
defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence against
him either in examining witnesses or argument to the
jury. The Court observed that “post-arrest silence is
insolubly ambiguous” because such silence during custodial interrogation can be interpreted either to indicate
reliance on Miranda rights or to support the inference
that a later exculpatory story was a fabrication.14
Because the Miranda warnings contain an implicit
“assurance that silence will carry no penalty,” use of
that silence to infer guilt denies the defendant due
process.
Griffin and Doyle stand for the principle that where
the exercise of constitutional rights is “insolubly
ambiguous” as between innocence and guilt, a prosecutor may not encourage the jury to construe the ambiguity against the defendant. By forcing a defendant either
to forgo the exercise of a constitutional right or be
penalized for exercising it, the prosecutor violates the
constitution and commits misconduct. Applying this
principle to Portuondo v. Agard, the prosecutor committed misconduct when she insinuated that the defendant’s presence in court and testimony on his own
behalf—the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation and the Fifth Amendment right to testify—should be taken by the jury as a basis for concluding that the defendant gave false testimony.
Five members of the Supreme Court saw the prosecutor’s conduct differently. Justice Scalia wrote the
majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. The majority
initially noted an absence of historical support for the
defendant’s position that his constitutional rights were
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violated by the prosecutor’s conduct. Justice Scalia
observed that defendants were disqualified from testifying under oath until well into the 19th century, so
there would be no occasion at that time to make such
comments. It was only after the Court’s decision in Griffin v. California that such a comment was challenged.15
Justice Scalia concluded, without any data to support
this assertion: “Evidently, prosecutors were making
these comments all along without objection; Griffin simply sparked the notion that such commentary might be
problematic.”16 As Justice Ginsburg correctly observed
in her dissent, “the absence of old cases prohibiting the
comment that the Court now confronts thus scarcely
indicates that generic accusations of tailoring have long
been considered constitutional.”17
In addition to asserting the absence of historical
support, the majority attempted to distinguish Griffin.
The majority observed that Griffin prohibited the jury
from doing something that they were not permitted to
do—infer guilt from a defendant’s silence. And such
prohibition is reasonable, according to the majority,
because the inference of guilt from silence is not always
“natural and irresistable.” There may be many reasons
why an innocent defendant chooses not to testify. By
contrast, according to Justice Scalia, it is entirely “natural and irresistable,” as well as entirely proper, for a
jury to evaluate the credibility of a defendant who testifies last by considering and weighing in the balance the
fact that the defendant heard the testimony of all witnesses who preceded him.18 Thus, according to the
majority, prohibiting a prosecutor from advising a jury
about the defendant’s ability to tailor his testimony
from his presence in the courtroom differs from Griffin
in that it prohibits a jury to do that which it is perfectly
entitled to do, or requires a jury to do something that is
practically impossible.
Moreover, according to the majority, Griffin prohibited comment that suggested that a defendant’s silence
is evidence of guilt. The prosecutor’s comments in
Agard, by contrast, concerned the defendant’s credibility as a witness and were therefore, according to the
majority, in accordance with the longstanding rule that
when a defendant takes the stand, his credibility may
be impeached like that of any other witness. Of course,
as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, an argument
that goes to the defendant’s credibility also goes to his
guilt.19 For as Justice Scalia noted in the first sentence of
his opinion, the defendant’s trial “ultimately came
down to a credibility determination.”20
Moreover, the majority noted, the generic comment
that the Agard prosecutor made is not that different
from the instruction that a judge routinely gives a jury,
namely, that in weighing the defendant’s credibility, the
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jury may consider the defendant’s deep personal interest in the outcome of the case.21 The prosecutor’s comment, in short, is “appropriate—and indeed, given the
inability to sequester the defendant, sometimes essential—to the central function of the trial, which is to discover the truth.”22
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed defendant’s claim
that by being required to be present at trial pursuant to
New York statutory law,23 the defendant was denied
due process because of the prosecutor’s comment on
that forced presence. The defendant claimed that such
comment is prohibited by Doyle, which held that a prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s silence after being
given Miranda warnings violated due process because
the Miranda warnings contain an implicit “assurance
that silence will carry no penalty.” However, according
to the majority, it is not possible to believe that a similar
assurance of impunity is implicit in New York’s statute
requiring the defendant to be present at trial. Moreover,
according to Justice Scalia, there is “no authority whatever for the proposition that impairment of credibility,
if any, caused by mandatory presence at a trial violated
due process.”24
Justices Stevens and Breyer concurred in the result,
essentially because of the “high threshhold” necessary
to establish that a state trial was constitutionally unfair.
Nevertheless, these Justices strongly disagreed with the
Court’s “implicit endorsement of [the prosecutor’s]
summation.”25 The two concurring Justices accused the
Court of “demeaning” the adversary process, “violating
the respect” for a defendant’s individual dignity, and
“ignoring” the presumption of innocence. These Justices
urged federal and state trial judges to bar prosecutors
from making such arguments, or to explain to juries the
necessity and justification for a defendant’s attendance
at trial.
According to the dissent by Justice Ginsburg, joined
by Justice Souter, the Court’s decision “transforms a
defendant’s presence at trial from a Sixth Amendment
right into an automatic burden on his credibility.”26 The
prosecutor, according to the dissent, unfairly burdened
the defendant’s constitutional rights by urging the jury
to construe the “insolubly ambiguous” exercise of those
rights against the defendant. As Justice Ginsburg noted,
“It is no more possible to know whether the defendant
used his presence at trial to figure out how to tell potent
lies from the witness stand than it is to know whether
an accused who remains silent had no exculpatory story
to tell.”27
The Court’s decision, according to Justice Ginsburg,
does not advance the search for truth because it allows
a prosecutor to make a generic accusation at the defendant’s ability to use his presence to tailor his testimony
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whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. The prosecutor did not tie her accusation to any specific testimony by the defendant, which if factually based probably
would have been proper.28 Instead, the prosecutor’s
“broadside,” fired after the defense submitted its case
and completed its summation, constituted an
“irrebutable observation” that could be made about any
testifying defendant, guilty or innocent. Moreover, by
making such argument on summation after the defendant’s summation, a prosecutor effectively prevents a
defendant from answering the charge.29
Griffin and Doyle are indistinguishable from Agard’s
case, despite the Court’s attempt to isolate them. First,
the inference of guilt from silence is certainly “natural
and irresistable” in most cases.30 That is why the jury
must be instructed not to draw such inference.31 The
inference involved in Griffin is at least as “natural and
irresistable” as the inference the prosecutor in Agard’s
case invited the jury to draw. There are reasons why an
innocent defendant might not wish to testify. And there
are reasons why an innocent person might choose to
remain silent after arrest. But in each of these instances,
something beyond the defendant’s innocence must be
hypothesized in order to explain the defendant’s behavior.
Not so in Agard’s case. If a defendant appears at
trial and gives testimony that fits the rest of the evidence, complete innocence could explain such behavior.
As Justice Ginsburg explained: “Unless one has prejudged the defendant as guilty, or unless there are specific reasons to believe that particular testimony has
been altered, the possibility that the defendant is telling
the truth is surely as good an explanation for the coherence of the defendant’s testimony as any that involves
wrongful tailoring.”32
The Agard decision is wrong in principle, and
wrong as policy. Prosecutors, at least in the federal
criminal justice system, now are afforded broad license
to denigrate a defendant’s testimony simply by insinuating that his mere presence in the courtroom during
his trial gave him a chance to tailor his testimony. Given
the usual respect and confidence that jurors have for the
prosecutor,33 such argument, although potentially very
misleading, can be devastating to a defendant’s chance
for a fair trial. Prosecutors are not barred from crossexamining the defendant by asking specific questions
that might be relevant to the accusation of tailoring.
Nor is a prosecutor barred from arguing during summation about such fact-specific reasons that might suggest the existence of tailoring. What the Second Circuit
disallowed, and the Supreme Court licensed, is a generic argument that states, in essence, that if a defendant
chooses to testify, his testimony always may be assailed
as a fabrication because he sat through the trial and had

an opportunity to hear the testimony of all the other
witnesses. The only ways the defendant can avoid such
innuendo is either by absenting himself from the trial—
not a realistic option—or by testifying prior to the testimony of all the other witnesses, including government
witnesses, not a permissible option.
Agard is not an isolated instance of the Court
adding to the prosecutor’s already formidable arsenal
of power. It is simply another example of a trend over
the past 30 years that has further skewed the balance of
power in the criminal justice system in the prosecutor’s
favor.34 This unsettling trend can be seen in the prosecutor’s investigatory, charging, convicting, and sentencing powers.35 Moreover, the judiciary has, in effect,
shifted its focus from an attempt to deter prosecutorial
misconduct to affording prosecutors increasing license
to “strike foul blows.”36 This can be seen in the expansion of harmless error, the demise of supervisory
power, and the absence of meaningful standards to
guide prosecutorial discretion. In addition, attempting
to control prosecutorial misconduct through professional discipline is virtiually non-existent.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s Agard decision
is deeply troubling. It seems so inconsistent with earlier
precedents such as Griffin and Doyle, and insidious as a
matter of criminal justice policy. But the decision is
completely in keeping with the increasingly laissez-faire
attitude by the Supreme Court towards prosecutors.
State courts, of course, can impose more rigorous standards on prosecutors than the federal judiciary. And
although unlikely, lawmakers troubled by an increasingly distorted criminal justrice system may see the
need for legislative reforms either to correct the imbalance, or make prosecutors who misconduct themselves
more accountable.
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